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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to conduct and observe experimentation, using the 
unclassified Common Operating Picture tool SeaVision, in conjunction with the 
Surveillance, Persistent Observation and Target Recognition (SPOTR) program created 
by Progeny. These systems together will utilize unclassified satellite imagery to detect, 
classify and identify vessels at sea using computer vision (CV) algorithms. The CV 
algorithms use imagery of vessels of interest (VOI) to create a three-dimensional model 
that is used to detect and identify vessels in the satellite imagery. Images and information 
regarding these vessels were gathered from unclassified sources for analysis and building 
of the three-dimensional models. The information-gathering process would benefit from 
infusion or access to intelligence information for building image libraries of VOI. The 
technology, while still maturing, shows potential for implementation in various facets 
onboard surveillance platforms and unmanned surface and air vehicles. 
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The United States Navy has increased emphasis on Maritime Domain Awareness 
(MDA) as their operational focus shifts from primarily blue water operations to the 
littorals (United States, Department of the Navy, 2007). The elements of security, safety, 
economy, and the environment are included in MDA (United States, Department of 
Homeland Security, 2005). These elements are negatively impacted throughout the global 
maritime domain by acts such as piracy, illegal fishing, smuggling, and trafficking 
(United States, Department of Homeland Security, 2005). These acts are common in the 
Southeast Asia (SEA) region, near the South China Sea (SCS), which is the focus for our 
research.   
The SCS suffers from expansive incidence of illegal, unreported and unregulated 
(IUU) fishing, piracy, human trafficking, and seabed resource claims conflicts. 
Compounding the problem, at least half of all global seaborne commerce crosses through 
the SCS region. These issues threaten maritime security and the global economy within 
the region because host nations are unable to contain the problem. The countries in and 
around the SCS do not collaborate and create partnerships for maritime operations to 
keep the region fair, secure and reliable. Improved interoperability and information 
sharing can assist in improving MDA. Improved MDA provides greater actionable 
information, enabling countries within the region to respond better to incidences of 
undesired behavior.  
A. OBJECTIVE 
1. Research Question
If an increase in information availability on MDA can be achieved, are nations 
better able to prosecute maligned actors, resulting in decreased incidence of unwanted 
and illegal activity?  The study will determine whether the use of SPOTR, a product of 
Progeny Systems, and satellite or other image sources improve the capability for 
SeaVision, an unclassified common operational picture (COP), to detect and identify 
uncooperative vessels.  
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2. Research Intent  
The purpose of this research is to conduct an MDA experiment within the 
confines of the Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT) ‘18 exercise. Nine 
countries participated in SEACAT 2018, which included Bangladesh, Brunei, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, along with the United States 
(CTF-73 Public Affairs, 2018).  The experiment will determine if the actionable MDA 
qualities of shareability, accuracy, revisit time, and track quality are achievable in an 
unclassified cooperative environment by using unclassified MDA tools for developing 
tracks and maintaining persistency. A concept of operations (CONOPS) has been 
developed for implementation during the SEACAT exercise. The CONOPS proposes the 
use of unclassified MDA tools to develop tracks on vessels of interest (VOI). MDA tools 
will ingest the unclassified, space-based imagery, to assist in detecting VOI that may not 
be broadcasting Automated Identification System (AIS) data, using computer vision 
(CV). The results will highlight exercise information sharing challenges, determining 
how they might be resolved and how the challenges might apply to other regions. The 
MDA CONOPS will then be refined to consider the need for developing maritime 
behavioral models. These models would increase the ability to deduce specific maritime 
activity such as IUU fishing, smuggling, military action, and other activities of interest. 
The concepts of unclassified information sharing and behavior models for pattern of life 
(POL) will be explored to determine how they can be implemented on a broader level 
through further research.  
The goal is to identify possible enhancements to existing MDA policies and 
procedures. These will introduce new practices and operational concepts to enhance 
current MDA warfighting, expose issues, and identify possible solutions. The possibility 
exists that the experiment could conflict with SEACAT exercise execution. Steps are in 
progress to mitigate the risk and will be discussed with exercise coordinators and nation 
participants at the SEACAT Initial Planning Conference (IPC). Expected 
recommendations are expanded use of SeaVision for information sharing and the 
Common Operating Picture (COP) tool. Currently, SeaVision utilizes AIS, radar, vessel 
monitoring systems, and long-range identification and tracking systems (SeaVision Data 
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Sources). These system inputs, while useful, have difficulty detecting, identifying, and 
tracking uncooperative targets. This study seeks to explore and adapt the use of 
Surveillance, Persistent Observation and Target Recognition (SPOTR) computer vision 
combined with all sources of unclassified imagery to enhance SeaVision’s capabilities, 
including exploring the use of SPOTR on MPA aircraft to improve and accelerate the 
meaningful delivery of information to users. We anticipate that SPOTR will be able to 
collect data over time on VOI, creating a historical timeline of locations and behavior.  
The study will implement a quantitative research approach to determine the 
effectiveness of implementing SeaVision and SPOTR in tandem. With the successful 
implementation of CV to track VOI, the end state will accomplish two Department of 
Defense (DoD) objectives for building shared MDA with SEA partners. These objectives 
are to provide public goods and support U.S. exercises, operations, and contingency 
response missions (Helvey & Harvey, 2018). Ultimately, the sharing of information 
would increase capabilities and, therefore, empower the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) partners to complete individual operational requirements.  
B. PARTNERSHIP  
Numerous parties showed interest in the use of CV to enhance MDA at the outset, 
which included Commander 7th Fleet (C7F), Commander Task Force 73 (CTF 73), 
Commander U.S. Naval Forces Korea (CNFK), Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF), 
and members of the ASEAN. C7F was the operational research sponsor for this project 
since the SCS is in their area of responsibility. C7F showed minor interest in this 
particular research and experimental area and directed us to CTF-73 (Boger & Miller, 
2018). CTF-73 became the main focus for coordination, since they were the officer in 
charge of the SEACAT exercise.   
Progeny Systems Corporation creates hardware and software solutions for the 
Department of Defense and other government agencies, including surveillance and 
computer vision solutions such as SPOTR (Progeny, 2019). Two members from Progeny, 
Tim Faltemier and Karsten Steinhaeuser, were identified to assist in this research project. 
Tim and Karsten, using unclassified images of United Nations (UN) sanction vessels 
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provided to Progeny, would create a three-dimensional model of a VOI. This three-
dimensional model will be used for vessel identification with input from vessel image 
libraries. Progeny System employees will determine a method for converting SPOTR 
output into SeaVision for track creation. SeaVision representatives will provide 
consultation to Progeny for creating compatible track inputs and for utilizing the 
information sharing and analysis tools in SeaVision for the benefit of participants.  
The resource sponsors, SMEs assigned to the applicable Areas of Responsibility 
(AORs), and those working in Research and Development for new and future 
capabilities, will aid in observation and data collection. The CTF-73 MDA Advisor will 
provide expertise for the SEA region, regarding issues, challenges, as well as regional 
relations and conflicts. These contributions seek to improve SeaVision and build MDA 
capabilities through the SEACAT exercise.  
C. SHIFT IN FOCUS  
Prior to the IPC, we met with Charles Brown, from Booz Allen Hamilton in 
Singapore, to discuss the operational scenario designed by our predecessors to be 
implemented during SEACAT 2018 (Charles works as a contractor advising CTF-73 on 
MDA related matters). During our meeting with Charles Brown and his associates, it was 
discovered that the scenario we presented was not feasible during SEACAT 2018 due to 
operational limitations of participating nations.     
Based on these facts, the decision was made to shift focus to the UN-sanctions list 
for target VOI. This was predicated on an increased interest by C7F in the location and 
undertakings of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) vessels listed on the 
sanctions list. The challenges encountered with SEACAT participants’ information 
sharing capabilities, as well as the scarce amount of information received on VOIs used 
in the upcoming SEACAT exercise, contributed to the shift in focus.  
A discussion was held with a representative from SeaVision, during the IPC, 
regarding what our thesis wanted to accomplish and how SeaVision could interact with 
SPOTR to assist in achieving the desired results. The scenario developed for 
implementation during SEACAT allowed for experimentation within a semi-controlled 
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environment. Testing would be conducted during a real-world scenario within an 
uncontrolled environment. The uncontrolled nature of the problem also necessitated that 
we find information for the VOIs instead of receiving information, as would be the case 
with the contracted vessels for SEACAT.  
D. LIMITATIONS  
Discussions regarding our area of research were held with some members of 
participating countries to explain to them what we are trying to accomplish in enhancing 
the MDA in the SCS. ASEAN countries demonstrated the willingness to participate but 
cited issues with implementing the use of SeaVision as an information sharing MDA tool. 
Countries lacked the organic technology onboard operational maritime units capable of 
accessing and utilizing the SeaVision program. This includes limited or no internet 
access, which negates the use of SeaVision as an internet-based tool. Limited resources 
allocated to defense spending also results in limited deployment of naval units. Units that 
do not deploy suffer from mounting maintenance issues and untrained crews. The result 
is insufficient operational proficiency to utilize information that would be gleaned from 
using SeaVision for developing POL analysis for designated VOIs.  
Countries within the SCS were willing to share information with the United 
States, but not necessarily with each other. Regional conflicts and rivalries influence 
political relationships among countries. In order for SeaVision to operate to its fullest 
potential, these countries must be willing to work and share with each other to maximize 
MDA in the region. Differing priorities in what illicit activity takes precedence 
contributes to the divide. Illegal fishing may be more important to one country while 
another prioritizes smuggling or trafficking. Further, the entity conducting the illicit 
activity may belong to a country seen as an antagonist by the country labeling that vessel 
as a VOI. These limitations stunt the ability of fully deploying SeaVision as the 
information-sharing tool it is meant to be.  
E. APPROACH  
Since the original thesis approach was not supported by CTF-73, we chose an 
alternative path. This thesis will explain how the experiment might have been conducted, 
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but with emphasis on the UN-sanctioned list of ships. The idea is to still research and 
assess the viability of using SeaVision and CV to enhance observation of non-cooperative 
vessels of interest, especially the UN-sanctioned ships, and then make recommendations 
to resource sponsors and operational commanders on how such tools can be added to the 
MDA toolkit.  
Chapter II reviews the literature on MDA in general, UN-sanctioned ships, 
computer vision, and situation awareness. It also explores key concepts like information 
sharing between nations. Chapter III explains the methodology used to gather the 
information. Chapter IV presents the results of our analysis of these emerging 
capabilities, and how they can be used to support existing MDA processes. It also 
suggests how some of those processes ought to be amended. Chapter V summarizes our 
findings, reemphasizes key recommendations, and suggests areas of future research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The maritime domain of SEA is vital for global trade, making safe and secure sea 
lanes much more important, especially with eight of the ten busiest container ports in the 
world located in the Asia-Pacific region (Department of Defense, 2015). This region has 
roughly two-thirds of the world’s oil shipments transit through it, along with about 30 
percent of the world’s maritime trade that passes through the SCS alone (DoD, 2015). 
The amount of global trade transiting SEA should concern all nations, including the 
United States, where the maritime trade heading to the United States is approximately 
$1.2 trillion (DoD, 2015). 
The large amount of global commerce in the region, along with a lack of law 
enforcement, contributes to illegal activities such as piracy, fishing that is illegal, 
unreported and unregulated (IUU), smuggling, and trafficking. Our thesis focuses on the 
use of computer vision to enhance MDA in SEA by combining products and tools, such 
as unclassified commercial imagery and SeaVision, a program used to share AIS 
information. The importance of cooperation and information sharing between partner 
nations cannot be overstated. Tools like SeaVision allow for quick access to shared 
information between authorized users. 
In our thesis, we intend to use computer vision to create three-dimensional models 
of VOIs. These three-dimensional models will be used to conduct image analysis with 
new commercial images to detect, classify, and identify VOI. Metrics will be used to 
determine whether the process and tools are useful in improving MDA. The use of 
computer vision utilizing image analysis and information sharing can be tested at the 
SEACAT exercise or any other maritime exercise designed to locate or detect a VOI. 
A. MDA 
The United States defines MDA as anything related to the maritime domain that 
can impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States, such as 
any activities, infrastructure, vessels, or even cargo (Department of Homeland Security, 
2013). The maritime domain, which includes everything above, on, under, and adjacent 
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to any navigable waterway, continues to be vital to the success, prosperity, and security 
of the United States and its global partners (Ombo, 2015). The protection of the maritime 
domain impacts the entire population of the Earth as the waterways are used for 
transportation, shipping, providing food and water sources, international trade, and border 
protection for countries and protection from other countries. 
Our thesis focuses on the Asia-Pacific region, but, more specifically, it focuses on 
Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. MDA is critical in this area, as a significant 
portion of the global maritime trade transits through the region, and a large number of 
piracy incidents occur in the region (Bueger, 2015). Also, disputes among nations due to 
geographical concerns and historical tensions hinder cooperation in the region (Bueger, 
2015). Decision-makers require accurate, relevant, and timely information to be able to 
anticipate potential threats and to take decisive and appropriate actions against existing 
threats (DHS, 2013). Information needs to be collected and disseminated between nations 
to improve MDA so the nations receiving the information can analyze the data to make 
informed decisions to increase maritime security in the region (DHS, 2013).  
1. Overview 
Issues that continue to concern nations regarding the maritime domain in the SCS 
include IUU fishing, piracy, human trafficking, and smuggling. Piracy has seen a 
significant rise in incidents since the 1980s and has remained a persistent problem in the 
region ever since (Bueger, 2015). Each nation in the region feels the effects of these 
issues differently, and, therefore, each of their respective priorities differ from one 
another. Differences in priorities amongst nations may impede the progress of increasing 
MDA in the area, but ultimately all of the nations are affected by these issues and would 
greatly benefit by cooperating and sharing with each other.  
a. IUU Fishing 
According to a National Intelligence Council memorandum in 2016, an estimated 
15 to 30 percent of global annual catches are being conducted by IUU fishing. IUU 
fishing not only heightens tensions between neighboring countries, but it can also 
encourage piracy due to the lack of skill required to conduct piracy operations (NIC, 
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2016). It is hard to enforce fishing laws due to the difficulty in distinguishing between 
legal and illegally caught fish, and the profits obtained exceed the potential risk involved 
(NIC, 2016). See Figure 1 for a graphic of common forms of IUU Fishing. A large 
number of nations border the SCS, including members of the ASEAN. These coastal 
communities rely heavily on fishing and other resources from the ocean to produce a food 
source and a means of earning a living for their families (United Nations, 2017). A 
country’s right to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the SCS is being taken 
advantage of by these illegal practices of fishing. The United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes a country’s EEZ. Unfortunately, not all countries 
abide by UNCLOS, or follow its rulings, causing more concern in a high traffic area such 
as the SCS. 
 
Figure 1. IUU Fishing Forms Found in South China Sea. Source: National 
Intelligence Council (2016). 
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b. Piracy / Trafficking / Smuggling 
Along with IUU fishing, piracy is another major concern in SEA that creates 
issues in the maritime domain. Countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Thailand are cooperating with each other to reduce piracy in the region (Valencia, 2018).  
Piracy is an issue that receives more attention from nations than other concerns such as 
trafficking and smuggling. Piracy attacks affect more countries than smuggling or 
trafficking, therefore, they receive more attention and resources from nations to combat 
it. This common problem allows countries to work with each other toward a common 
goal of eliminating piracy.  
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) is a division of the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and tracks piracy and armed robbery attacks against ships 
throughout the world (IMB, 2019). According to the IMB 2018 report, the total number 
of attacks in SEA dropped from 76 attacks in 2017 to 60 attacks in 2018 (IMB, 2019). 
The decline in number of reported attacks in SEA is a good thing, but the total number of 
attacks in the region is still one of the largest in the world. See Figure 2 for a breakdown 
of reported incidents separated by region. The numbers listed in the IMB report are just 
the confirmed, reported attacks and may not represent the total number of attacks in the 
region, as there are most likely attacks that occurred and went unreported (IMB, 2019). 
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Figure 2. Reported Piracy Incidents Reported in 2018. Source: International 
Maritime Bureau (2019). 
While trafficking and smuggling may not get the attention or resources to combat 
these issues as piracy does, they are still a major concern in the region. Military 
confrontations, disputes over territory, and nuclear proliferation are not the only threats to 
security (Caballero-Anthony, 2018). According to the Asia-Pacific Maritime Security 
Strategy published by the United States’ Department of Defense, non-traditional threats, 
such as illegal trafficking and smuggling, pose significant security challenges (DoD, 
2015). Transnational crimes, such as human trafficking, are prevalent throughout the 
world with a large portion coming from SEA. This crime generates a lot of money 
globally, more than $150 billion each year (Caballero-Anthony, 2018). Figure 3 shows 
the percentage of human trafficking profits by region. The Asia-Pacific region is the 




Figure 3. Percentage of Human Trafficking Profits from around the World. 
Source: Caballero-Anthony (2018). 
The severity of the security challenges depends on what material or items are 
being smuggled and whether the material or items will affect only the southeast region of 
Asia but the entire world. The region of SEA is a major transit and shipping area for 
maritime cargo, as many of the world’s busiest ports are located within the countries of 
China, Singapore, and South Korea (Kassenova, 2012). A major security concern deals 
with the threat of smuggling weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or materials that can 
aid in the creation of WMD, such as nuclear and radiological material (Kassenova, 2012). 
This threat is elevated with the uncertainty of North Korea’s nuclear program and can be 
a significant concern to all of the nations in the region.  
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c. MDA that is UNCLAS 
Our thesis focuses on the sharing of unclassified (UNCLAS) information that will 
improve the MDA of the United States and its partners in the South China Sea. Sharing 
UNCLAS information is easier than sharing classified information among partnering 
nations, requires fewer resources, and information sharing can develop trust and 
confidence in the partnerships (Bueger, 2015). Policies and procedures that are followed 
for sharing classified information are too time consuming for some of the information to 
be useful. Unclassified information is more accessible to all nations involved and poses a 
lower risk to security than sharing classified information. 
d. Easy to Share 
The sharing of information amongst partners in the SEA will increase the ability 
to detect, identify, and classify VOI and improve the overall MDA in the area. One way 
to increase the information sharing is to establish a web-centric enterprise service, such as 
SeaVision, to share the information gathered by individual nations (DHS, 2013). This 
web-centric enterprise will allow authorized users access to a large volume of data from 
multiple sources that can be used to accomplish each country’s priorities and missions 
(DHS, 2013). The web-centric approach allows for quick and easy access to information 
in near real time and allows for responsive actions. 
e. Resources 
The resources available to each country and ability to gather, process, and 
disseminate information vary. A lack of resources by one country can be alleviated by the 
sharing of information from another. With information sharing, the limited resources one 
has may be better allocated to a particular geographic area or particular action such as 
piracy or IUU fishing. Allocating resources to a particular focus will provide a better 
product and more specific data to be easily shared into a database for others to access. 
Information on the maritime domain is being collected by many agencies, both military 
and civilian, and from many countries (Gusti, Dharma, Anak, & Perwita, 2018). This 
amount of information gathering is not only redundant, but also a waste of resources. 
Much of the same information is being gathered from multiple sources and by multiple 
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nations. The sharing of information will free up resources that may be better served 
participating in other tasks or missions. 
A navy is one of the most important assets for collecting information and 
establishing MDA (Gusti et al., 2018). The size of a navy plays an important role in 
developing MDA and would benefit greatly from information sharing as the strength of 
each navy in SEA varies drastically. According to the Global Firepower website (2019), 
the total naval strength of Cambodia, Laos (though landlocked, the Mekong River has its 
own share of irregular water-based activities), and Singapore in 2018 were 27, 36, and 40 
ships, respectively. This does not appear to be enough assets to collect data and process 
the information, use the information to meet the tasks required, and to defend one’s 
territory. Sharing information will assist in utilizing the resources of each nation to 
maximize the potential and limit redundancy by separate agencies. 
f. Develop Trust 
A sense of trust needs to be present when working with partners to accomplish a 
common goal. Unfortunately, many nations in SEA harbor deep-seated mistrust toward 
each other based on historical events (Valencia, 2018). According to Bueger, information 
sharing in SEA is influenced heavily by the relations between each nation and their 
respective national interests (Bueger, 2015). In addition to national interests, the 
disagreements, tensions, historical friendships, alliances, and struggles over influence 
also shape not just the quantity but the quality of information to be shared as well 
(Bueger, 2015). This becomes very problematic when trying to increase MDA and 
counter the rising threat of piracy and IUU fishing in the region. 
A willingness to share data among nations must be evident for trust and 
cooperation to develop. A way trust can be built is by sharing information about issues 
with partners that are interested in that particular area. Some countries are more 
concerned with piracy while others are more focused on illegal fishing or smuggling 
(Bueger, 2015). Countries will be reluctant to share information unless they are receiving 
information in return. This information being shared must be reliable, important, and 
helpful to meet the individual needs and interests of each country participating. Our thesis 
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focuses on the use of computer vision to increase the ease and ability to share 
information. Information sharing has the potential to strengthen the trust and confidence 
among partner nations in SEA (Bueger, 2015).  
2. COP 
A COP is a situational awareness tool that will benefit the Southeast Asia region 
and increase MDA. The DoD defines a COP in the Joint Publication 3-0 as a single 
identical display of relevant information that is shared by more than one entity and 
facilitates collaborative planning; it also assists in achieving situational awareness (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2017). Satellites, radars, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and other 
forms of human collection or reconnaissance used to gather information can be fused into 
a COP to provide near-real time data for decision-makers in the maritime domain (Ombo, 
2015). A COP should be easy to use and should allow each partner to analyze the 
information provided and use it to meet its individual objectives. 
There are numerous collection and information sharing centers in Southeast Asia, 
including the International Maritime Bureau, Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB PRC), the 
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
Ships in Asia, Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP ISC), and the Information Fusion 
Centre (IFC) (Bueger, 2015). Each of these centers has its own function and approach to 
information sharing. One of the centers reports, one shares, and the other fuses 
information as indicated in the organization’s respective names (Bueger, 2015). These 
organizations provide many pieces to the puzzle but ultimately for the information to be 
useful to increase MDA in the region, each country would need to have access to each 
organization. Unfortunately, not all nations participate in each of these information 
sharing centers (Bueger, 2015). A COP will allow all users to insert information into one 
place, be able to access this information, and see a universal display with all relevant 
inputs from other nations. Although there may be several advantages to having multiple 
information sharing centers, a COP presents a clearer picture. 
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B. COMPUTER VISION 
Computer vision attempts to create track data by detecting, classifying and 
identifying vessels captured in satellite imagery (North Carolina State University, 2016). 
Creating usable data in this manner is a complex process because computer vision is an 
inverse problem (Szeliski, 2010). Through computer vision, we are seeking to find an 
unknown solution without having sufficient data, requiring the creation of models for 
determining probability among potential solutions (Szeliski, 2010). Computer vision 
allows machines to accomplish this task through recreating the three-dimensional 
structure of an object within imagery (Szeliski, 2010). Image capturing devices project 
the features of three-dimensional objects into two-dimensional images using points, lines 
and planes (Szeliski, 2010). Vision systems must recreate these features and project them 
back into a three-dimensional model. That is where the inverse problem originates, since 
a two-dimensional image will not have all the information required to develop a three-
dimensional model. Structure from motion (SFM) techniques assist in defeating the 
inverse problem (Verhoeven, 2011). SFM reconstructs the three-dimensional geometry of 
an object from a sequence of two-dimensional images captured by a camera moving 
around the scene (Verhoeven, 2011). This enables the capturing of an object from 
multiple angles and increases the likelihood of retrieving the complete three-dimensional 
details of the scene (Verhoeven, 2011). Computer vision within this study develops 
models of ships at sea. The VOI are not available for an imaging device to capture from 
multiple angles at a single instance. The solution that supplements this detriment is 
capturing and compiling numerous images of VOI from multiple angles into a library for 
generation of three-dimensional models.  
The vision system matches vessels detected in satellite imagery to three-
dimensional models created from images in the library. The matching is accomplished 
through feature extraction and matching, which are essential components of the computer 
vision application (Szeliski, 2010). The process is described by Szeliski (2010), where 
computer vision analyzes the images in the image library and extracts identifying features 
for the objects of interest. These features, once extracted, enable matching to objects in 
future images (Szeliski, 2010). This is the premise for model-based reconstruction, 
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extracting features from multiple images of multiple angles of an object, creating a three-
dimensional model and matching future images of objects to that model with some level 
of probability (Szeliski, 2010). Szeliski (2010) introduces the machine learning aspect of 
computer vision, where the system accurately identifies and classifies objects. The 
machine accomplishes identification and classification through detection and extraction 
of identifying features (Szeliski, 2010). After feature extraction from chosen images, 
Szeliski (2010) describes how the machine can identify objects in future images through 
feature matching. 
1. Machine Learning 
Machine learning is a versatile technology capable of detecting objects within an 
image and classifying or identifying these objects into specific categories (LeCun, Bengio 
& Henton, 2015). The machine learning system trains towards the scenario to ensure an 
accurate and desired outcome (Soni, 2018). There are two main categories of machine 
learning introduced by Soni (2018), supervised learning and unsupervised learning. 
Unsupervised learning, according to Soni (2018), is more exploratory in nature and 
geared towards identifying structure in raw data. Soni (2018) presents that supervised 
learning performs in the context of regression or classification, where the goal is to find 
specific relationships or structures between the input and the output. In this instance, we 
want to train the machine to detect the presence of an object in an image as the input and 
determine whether the object is an ocean-going vessel, what the vessel type is and, 
optimally, the specific identification of that vessel as the output (Soni, 2018). We collect 
a large dataset of images, some with ships, some without, and feed these images into the 
machine (LeCun et al., 2015). During training, according to LeCun et al. (2015), the 
machine is shown each image and outputs a vector of scores for each category, i.e., ship 
or not a ship. The desired outcome, per LeCun et al. (2015) research, is for images with 
ships to have higher scores on this vector. An objective function is created to measure the 
error between the actual output of scores and the desired output of scores (LeCun et al., 
2015). Research conducted by LeCun et al., (2015) finds that the machine modifies its 
internal parameters according to the existing error in order to reduce the error and output 
scores closer to the desired output. The process of feeding the machine the input vector or 
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set of images, computing the output and associated errors, computing a gradient vector 
for the weighting of the machine’s parameters and adjusting of the weighting to match 
the gradient vector repeats until the average of the objective functions ceases to decrease 
(LeCun et al., 2015). Once training is complete, LeCun et al. (2015) determined that the 
machine would be fed test data to determine the ability to generate sensible results from 
data is has never seen before.  
The training regimen perpetrates over several cycles. The first cycle trains the 
machine to identify the presence of a ship or lack thereof. Subsequent cycles train the 
machine to differentiate between classes or types of ships. These classifications can 
include broad categorizations such as distinguishing between warships and merchant 
vessels, or narrow classification, such as identifying fishing vessels, tankers, general 
cargo ships, dredgers, etc. The ultimate goal trains the machine to identify specific 
vessels or warship classes. Through this method, the machine receives raw data from the 
images and discovers the representations needed for detection and classification (LeCun 
et al., 2015). Traditional machine learning, according to the research by LeCun et al. 
(2015), is limited in feature extraction for pattern recognition and classification. Multi-
layer neural networks have been designed for machine learning analysis of two-
dimensional data such as images and video (Arel, Rose & Karnowski, 2010). To 
implement the regimen of cycles described, the research by LeCun et al. (2015), showed 
that the machine uses a multi-layer deep learning architecture that develops increasingly 
complex representations for detecting and learning features within the images. The multi-
layer deep learning enables the detection of minute differences between images with 
increasing complexity at each level, allowing for greater differentiation and classification 
(LeCun et al., 2015).  
2. Image Analysis 
The computer vision relationship with the camera system is the same relationship 
between the human brain and the human eye (Nixon & Aguado, 2012). This research 
showed that both the human eye and the camera system capture data and send it to the 
human brain or computer vision system respectively, for processing and analysis. Nixon 
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and Aguado (2012) computer vision conducts image analysis at multiple levels. Their 
work found that multiple layer analysis is necessary to extract the full range of features 
needed for complete analysis. This research shows that low-level feature extraction is 
basic feature detection without accompanying shape information. Low-level features 
include edge detection, which reproduces the line drawing, and corner detection, the 
point where lines bend sharply (Nixon & Aguado, 2012). The research by Nixon and 
Aguado (2012) found that edge detection uses vertical changes in contrast intensity to 
detect horizontal edges and horizontal changes in contrast intensity to detect vertical 
edges. Research by Szeliski (2010) complements these findings through determining that 
image contrasts naturally occur around the boundaries of images or objects. Nixon and 
Aguado (2012) determined that detecting contrast aids in identifying the boundaries of 
features and objects in an image. Addition findings by Nixon and Aguado (2012) in their 
research determine that corner detection or curvature consists of edge direction rate of 
change. This research shows that curvature ranges from edge direction changing rapidly, 
such as corners, to more gradually or non-existent change such as contours or straight 
lines. Based on this research, Nixon and Aguado (2012) determined that computer vision 
commonly calculates curvature through determining the angular change along the curve’s 
path. Alternatively, changes in image intensity can determine curvature within an image 
(Nixon & Aguado, 2012).  
While low-level feature extraction focuses on merely determining boundaries 
within an image, high-level feature extraction involves identifying actual shapes and 
objects within images (Nixon & Aguado, 2012). The same study determined that high-
level feature extraction uses low-level features of points, lines and edges to define objects 
with greater complexity. High-level feature extraction, according to Nixon and Aguado 
(2012) research, seeks high levels of invariance to enable computer vision to find shapes 
and objects reliably regardless of varying conditions. Invariance, according to their study, 
involves finding and identifying objects within an image regardless of position, 
orientation, size, scale or illumination within the image. Nixon and Aguado (2012) found 
that identification of edges, contours and points enable matching between objects 
regardless of orientation or scale. Further findings showed that invariance is necessary to 
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progress from mere detection to actual extraction. Through this study, Nixon and Agaudo 
(2012) determined that detection of an object only implies knowledge of its existence 
within an image. Further research determined that object extraction requires developing a 
description of a shape computer vision can recognize regardless of the circumstances of 
capture for the object within the image. This involves developing a template for the 
object we are trying to find and matching that template to objects within an image (Nixon 
& Aguado, 2012). For example, we know what a ship looks and how they are generally 
shaped, but from the work of Nixon and Agaudo (2012), we know difficulties can arise 
from rotational and scale invariance. Developing a template enables computer vision to 
detect and extract the ship object from its background, whether that be the ocean, a pier, 
etc, and conduct analysis to classify and identify the specific vessel.  
3. Metrics 
We must develop a feedback system to determine the viability and performance of 
the machine. This involves creating measurements or metrics for objective observation 
and determination of system performance. The purpose of metrics is threefold and 
includes 1) determining how well the system works and what the system is worth; 2) 
making an existing system perform better; and 3) designing and preparing future systems 
so they will function better and more efficiently (Raisbeck, 1979). With these criteria, we 
are able to determine whether the machine provides a satisfactory solution to our problem 
(Sproles, 2002). Metrics are divided into two viewpoints: measures of effectiveness, 
which focus on external output, and measures of performance, which focus on internal 
operation (Sproles, 2002). Measures of effectiveness establish how well computer vision 
achieves it intended purpose of improving MDA and contributing to a decrease of illegal 
maritime activities (Sproles, 2002). Measures of performance detail the efficiency and 
precision of the system in accomplishing its desired tasks (Sproles, 2002).  
We judge the effectiveness of the system by its ability to provide an adequate 
solution for the desired problem (Sproles, 2002). It must be determined that the added 
ability to detect, identify and track vessels through satellite imagery will improve the 
ability to reduce undesired activity (piracy, smuggling, IUUF, human trafficking, etc.). 
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Further, historical data must be presented in a “before” and “after” fashion to demonstrate 
a correlation between reduction in undesired activity and employment of computer vision 
in conjunction with SeaVision. Partner nations’ usage of SeaVision and computer vision 
must increase their ability to find and track vessels of interest. Information sharing 
through SeaVision must support the ability to view these statistics and measure whether 
SeaVision increases a partner nation’s capabilities for MDA. We can also determine, if at 
any given time, partner nations are able to, with greater accuracy, pinpoint the 
whereabouts and pattern of life for personally-vested vessels of interest versus sometime 
in the past. SeaVision must demonstrate the ability to consistently detect and track 
vessels of interest while the vessels in question are not radiating AIS and demonstrating 
intent to evade detection and identification. These measurements fall within the scope of 
determining the effectiveness of coupling SeaVision with computer vision and 
determining whether this system meets the needs of countries for improving MDA 
(Sproles, 2002). 
The performance of the system lies in the internal efficiency of the system 
(Sproles, 2002). Performance focuses on ensuring that when we receive an output, that 
output is as accurate and correct as possible (Sproles, 2002). Performance criteria include 
the ability to detect a ship within an image and determining the probability that the 
system will detect the vessel’s presence in said image. Machine learning feeds into the 
performance, ensuring the system increases the probability of determining the presence of 
a ship within an image (LeCun et al., 2015). The training of the machine must ensure the 
presence of weather, atmosphere, shore features or other elements within the image that 
may degrade image quality or obfuscate the presence of a vessel and does not unduly 
reduce the probability of detection (LeCun et al., 2015). This necessitates the presence of 
a feedback system to indicate that a vessel was present but not detected by the system. 
The system must accurately classify detected vessels into predetermined vessel classes. 
These classes, as discussed earlier, may start broad and, as machine learning evolves, 
classification narrows to become more specific (LeCun et al., 2015). From this, we can 
determine the probability of classification and establish a benchmark for acceptability 
probability for system classification. Classification then leads to identification. We must 
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measure the probability of identification from detected ships and classified ships. We 
must also determine if the system will identify a vessel even if unable to classify that 
same vessel. The scope of this thesis focuses primarily on measures of performance or 
the output internal to the system (Sproles, 2002). This involves consistently and 
accurately detecting, classifying and identifying VOIs from the dataset of the UN-
sanctioned vessels list compiled into a working image library. 
C. SOUTHEAST ASIA: SEACAT AND UN SANCTION VESSELS 
The SEACAT exercise occurs annually under the guidance of CTF-73 
(Commander, Task Force 73, 2017). The proposal was set forth to utilize the SEACAT 
maritime exercise as an opportunity to implement the SeaVision and Computer Vision 
pairing within a controlled environment. SEACAT participants include numerous 
countries from the SCS region that experience many of the maritime challenges 
previously mentioned. Limited resources, impediments to information finding and 
sharing as well as sociopolitical challenges within the region act as impediments to 
tackling these challenges. CTF-73/COMPACFLT possess stakes in helping to build and 
maintain a collective MDA presence in the South China Sea that can be enjoyed by all 
participating countries. SeaVision is one tool that CTF-73 can offer to these countries to 
promote information sharing and improve their capabilities for VOI location and 
tracking. The SEACAT exercise, among other priorities, works to assist in improving 
nation’s MDA capabilities through VOI location of a target vessel (CTF 73, 2017). 
SeaVision capabilities would be utilized within this capacity to assist and improve MDA 
ability.  
Further analysis of MDA within SEA brought an additional viewpoint to the 
picture. C7F possess a strong interest in maintaining cognizance of North Korean vessels 
involved in questionable or nefarious activities within their AOR (U.S.-Indo Pacific 
Command, 2019). Vessels of particular interest are those found on the UN Sanctions List. 
These vessels actively attempt to disguise their locations and movements, keeping their 
AIS transponders in a non-transmitting state. SeaVision coupled with Computer Vision 
proposes the viable solution of detection, identification and tracking of these vessels 
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while they are engaged in illegal or questionable activity. SeaVision would be able to 
detect these vessels without AIS, determine who they are, what they are doing and 
develop a pattern of life profile. This information would be useful to not only the Seventh 
Fleet and subordinate commands, but also provides valuable information to allies 
operating in the Southeast Asia region. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Maintaining MDA in and around SEA and the SCS is a priority. While serving as 
maritime hub for global economic trade, the region also suffers from illicit maritime 
activity and regional geopolitical conflict. This requires the collection, analysis and 
dissemination of information to enable nations in the region to take appropriate action for 
rectifying these concerns. The information sharing requirements suggests that the sharing 
platform should be an unclassified web-based medium. This enables the widest 
availability and dissemination of information to allied partners. Resource availability 
differs by nation. A system or platform that is accessible and shared by all reduces the 
disparity in resources, engenders teamwork and trust, and decreases redundancy in 
resources dedicated to information gathering.  
SeaVision operates as a web-based COP, accepting inputs from AIS, radar and 
satellite imagery. The COP allows each participant to access and analyze the information 
provided by the system. Computer vision allows expansion of the injected information, 
with the intent of detecting and identifying vessels not actively identifying themselves 
through AIS or other means. Computer vision develops three-dimensional models of 
VOIs and uses them to classify and identify vessels detected in satellite imagery. 
Computer vision learns to recognize these vessels through the process of machine 
learning. The training occurs over several cycles, improving the machine’s capability to 
recognize and identify vessels with each iteration. Machines use various identifying 
features for analysis and image recognition during machine learning. These features 
develop a template for detecting, classifying and identifying vessels. The overall 
capability of system is determined by developing metrics to measure to performance of 
the system. These metrics measure both the internal efficiency and performance of the 
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systems, as well as determine the intended external output of the system. The SEACAT 
exercise, an annual maritime exercise in the SCS, exhibits the capabilities of Computer 
Vision and SeaVision together as a COP. Injecting the UN Sanctions vessels list and 
corresponding imagery and information allows observance of external effects of the 
additional information availability and sharing. 
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Our thesis research builds upon the work and research of our predecessors who 
designed a scenario that would be implemented during SEACAT 2018. This multi-year 
project started with research by Wreski and Lavoie (2017) to establish a CONOPS to 
provide a COP with shareable information for partner nations. The research project 
continued with the designing of an operational experiment by Stevie Greenway and Coey 
Sipes (2018) that would be implemented during SEACAT 2018. The scenario developed 
in the preceding thesis was based upon the rising tensions in the SCS due to increased 
piracy, EEZ encroachment, trafficking, and weapon smuggling (Greenway & Sipes, 
2018). The plan for our thesis research was to implement the designed scenario into the 
SEACAT 2018 exercise, adding an element to the boarding operations, and to test the 
proof of concept that CV will enhance MDA. After determining the scenario was outside 
the constraints of the exercise, our attention changed from conducting the experimental 
exercise to focusing on UN-sanction vessels. This involved finding and collecting 
available information and images for the sanction vessels, then collaborating with 
Progeny and SeaVision for using the information within the MDA tools. 
A. COLLECTION 
We received a copy of the UN-sanction vessels from the CTF 73 MDA Advisor 
with input from Commander, Naval Forces Korea N2 (S. Miller, personal 
communication, April 12, 2018).  UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718 
established the baseline for the sanctions of DPRK individuals and entities and was 
superseded by UNSCR 1874 (United Nations, 2018). Follow-on resolutions by the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) add or subtract vessels from the list. All 
resolutions and updates are uploaded to the UN website, creating a comprehensive 
sanctions list. The list received via correspondence on April 12, 2018, was compared 
against the UNSC sanctions list on the UN website, and verified for completeness and 
currency.  
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After verification of the sanctions list, we developed an image library for the 
target vessels. This entailed gathering as many images as possible of each VOI, 
attempting to find images with views from multiple angles, including an overhead shot, 
to aid in construction of the vessel three-dimensional model. The three-dimensional 
model would have later been used to identify vessels located in satellite imagery by CV. 
CV imported these identified vessels as tracks into SeaVision, for information sharing in 
support of MDA and the COP. Images of vessels on the sanctions list were retrieved from 
unclassified, open-sourced AIS websites. These websites were comprised of 
www.marinetraffic.com, www.vesselfinder.com and www.shipspotting.com. Figures 4 
and 5 are images of websites we used for our initial search for photographs of the UN-
sanctioned VOI. An image search of these websites produced an accumulated 476 total 
images for the image library, which included images for 62 of the 97 vessels on the 
sanctions list.  
 




Figure 5. Image of ShipSpotting Website. Source: ShipSpotting at 
www.shipspotting.com (2019). 
Library images were crosschecked with information from the website database to 
determine the dates and locations of each image of the vessel. Progeny requested this 
information to create a tentative historical timeline for each vessel’s movements and port 
calls (S. Miller, personal communication, September 20, 2018). Creating a historical 
timeline assists in finding initial overhead satellite imagery of vessels in the DigitalGlobe 
database for creating a complete three-dimensional model. The timeline for vessels in the 
image library ranged from 2001 to 2018. Vessels were found in 78 different locations or 
ports, covering a broad geographic area across Southeast Asia, from Russia to Australia. 
Latitude and longitude information was inconsistently labeled; however, we were able to 
retrieve what appeared to be accurate information for several vessels that were not 
captured in port. We consolidated the images, along with corresponding accurate 
locations and dates, and sent the information to the Progeny point of contact. We 
discarded any inaccurate location information. Images without corresponding locations 
were included in the image library, but notated for missing location information. 
Progeny, after receipt of our original information, requested verified locations and 
dates for as many vessels as possible, to assist in retrieving overhead images. We used 
www.vesselfinder.com, an AIS database, to find dates where sanction vessels 
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broadcasted AIS showing their location in port. We were able to find five vessels, 
through www.vesselfinder.com, that broadcasted AIS while in port on various dates. The 
dates for the locations were all within a six-month range. We specifically searched for 
vessels with recent dates, less than six months old, to increase the probability that satellite 
imagery, for the desired date and location, would be in the DigitalGlobe database. Figure 
6 shows an image of the vessel finder website we used for our secondary, and more 
refined, search of the UN sanctioned VOI. Of the vessel locations we discovered, three 
broadcasted from six different ports in China, one from Inchon, Korea and one from two 
different ports in the Philippines. Each vessel broadcasted their position in port on 
multiple dates, increasing the likelihood that Progeny could locate satellite imagery for an 
overhead view. This information was compiled in a similar format to the original 
information and sent to Progeny for review and implementation. 
 
Figure 6. Image of Vessel Finder Website. Source: Vessel Finder at 
www.vesselfinder.com (2019) 
29 
B. DETECTION AND METRICS 
Progeny would combine overhead imagery of VOIs with respective images from 
the image library to create the three-dimensional model. This image library compares the 
models with newly acquired unclassified imagery to find matches. SPOTR ingests the 
unclassified satellite imagery from the DigitalGlobe imagery database and runs detection 
and identification algorithms, comparing the images to the three-dimensional models. CV 
would be used to conduct the search of the database to detect and classify vessels. Figure 
7 is an image of the DigitalGlobe home page of its website. When SPOTR discovers a 
match, it sends the data to SeaVision, creating a track in the SeaVision system. These 
created tracks will fall under one of three categories in SeaVision; 1) detected, 2) 
classified, or 3) identified. A ship is detected when an image matches the criteria used to 
determine the presence of a maritime vessel, but not enough information is available to 
classify or identify the vessel. Classification is when a type of ship is recognized, such as 
an oiler, a cargo ship, or even a warship. The algorithm can determine what the type of 
ship is, based on the comparison between the three-dimensional model and the newly 
acquired image. However, there does not exist sufficient feature matching to identify a 
specific vessel. Identification is when the VOI matches the criteria being looked for and 
the exact vessel is found. A positive identification match provides multiple hits over time. 
Identification is the toughest category to place a vessel. Many vessels look the same and 
have similar designs and markings. Warships, for example, are tough to identify, but 
easily classified. Finding overhead images of a United States destroyer will allow the 
algorithm to classify the vessel, as possibly a Flight IIB, but the exact vessel, or hull 
number, will be unknown.  
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Figure 7. Image of DigitalGlobe Website Login Page. Source: DigitalGlobe 
at evwhs.digitalglobe.com/myDigitalGlobe/login (2019). 
The DigitalGlobe database has imagery dating back to 2014 allowing for analysis 
of historical movements and development of pattern of life for VOIs. The frequency of 
these hits, such as days, weeks, or months, demonstrates the efficacy of the process. 
Detecting and tracking targets every few days is useful for developing pattern of life 
information. Detecting and tracking a VOI every few months has limited usefulness and 
provides little information regarding the vessel’s conduct and habits. False positive 
identification of VOIs would further limit usefulness or skew the historical data. The 
SPOTR false target rate is low, meaning the detection of a target is generally trustworthy 
and accurate (Boger & Miller, 2018). False identification rate, however, is a phenomenon 
that requires further study. Determining the occurrence of false positive identification 
determines the veracity of the developed three-dimensional model, indicating whether 
enough data has been collected to build a model detailed enough to consistently identify 
targets with a high probability.  
The efficiency of the SPOTR, along with the accuracy of the model, must be 
considered to ensure the functionality of the entire feedback loop. The following 
discussion highlights areas for verification of system performance. Developers have 
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already reduced the occurrence of false targets to acceptably low levels (Boger & Miller, 
2018). Users can trust that, when the system indicates the presence of a target, the 
indication is legitimate. There is no method, however, to determine failure of the system 
to detect a target’s presence. A possible solution would be an alternative CV system 
capable of detecting missed targets. This raises two issues; First, this assumes the 
hypothetical alternative system is better at detection than SPOTR, which would beg the 
question why we are using SPOTR versus this hypothetical system; Second, this system 
uses excessive resources. Two redundant CV systems are operating concurrently to 
accomplish a single purpose. The alternative is to view the false negatives as an 
acceptable loss ratio. Based on training during machine learning, Progeny would adjust 
and improve the algorithms until the percentage of vessels that would not be detected 
falls below a predetermined acceptable level and use this percentage as an operational 
constraint.  
Following detection, SPOTR compares the target against feature sets developed 
for each type of vessel, enabling classification into one of eight categories (Boger & 
Miller, 2018). Results from classification should ensure the system can accurately and 
consistently label the category of detected vessels. Analysis of system output would have 
determined the probability that vessels detected are unable to be categorized. The 
analysis would also have determined what the leading cause for failure to classify, such 
as inconclusive information in the target image or lack of matching features. The 
determination must be made whether identification, without any level of reliable 
probability, is possible without classification. Based on the functions of the system, 
identification is unlikely if the feature information is unavailable to provide classification. 
This could lead to a low probability identification, where the system determines the 
identity could be one of several vessels, with low probability of varying degrees. 
Therefore, we would have established a base probability standard to be 0.95 confidence 
level, for the system to attribute positive identification. Any confidence level from 0.75 to 
0.949 would have received a probable identification label. Confidence levels less than 
0.75 would have received a possible identification label. Detection, classification and 
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identification provide the three pillars for system functionality. The accuracy of system 
performance ensures the effectiveness of its implementation 
C. CONCLUSION 
We developed an unclassified image library from the UN sanction vessels list 
using open sources for the VOIs that had information available. Approximately two 
thirds of the sanctions list were included in the image library. We further narrowed the 
list to vessels that broadcasted AIS with port and date information. This enabled Progeny 
to retrieve overhead images for creating a full three-dimensional model of the selected 
vessels. This reduced the list of VOIs from the original 97 on the sanctions list to five 
specific vessels. Progeny’s three-dimensional models of these VOIs would have been 
used to demonstrate the efficiency of the CV system for detection, classification and 
identification of targets. This demonstration would have established accuracy and 





Our thesis research changed from implementing a fictitious operational scenario 
in order to test a proof of concept to utilizing a list of actual VOI. These VOI, derived 
from the UN sanction vessels list, would be the subjects of this process of using CV with 
commercial imagery to detect, classify, and identify vessels when the vessels aren’t 
broadcasting AIS data. Several challenges were faced with the execution of this research 
and include:  
• Designed scenario unattainable
• Competing priorities
• Participating nations unable to meet requirements
• Limited to UNCLAS images
• Large amounts of data.
1. Designed Scenario Unattainable
The operational scenario designed by our predecessors appeared too ambitious to 
be implemented during SEACAT 2018. It became clear, as we attended the IPC and 
spoke with many of the participants of the exercise, that conducting the operational 
scenario would be unattainable. According to CTF-73, the use of computer vision to track 
VOI was too forward leaning for the partner nations to grasp and be able to execute 
(Boger & Miller, 2018). The designers of the SEACAT exercise contract Military Sealift 
Command (MSC) vessels to be implemented into the scenarios as VOI for boarding 
exercises.  
Even though the designed scenario wasn’t able to be implemented during the 
SEACAT exercise, another effort to track a VOI was attempted. We wanted to try to 
track a known VOI in the background of the SEACAT exercise using CV while not 
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interfering with the execution of the boarding scenarios. Tracking a known VOI would 
require an advanced notice of the vessels that would be contracted for use during the 
exercise to give plenty of time for the image collection and delivery. The collected 
images would be delivered to Progeny Systems Corporation employees assisting us in 
this research area, who would use the images to create a three-dimensional model of the 
vessels. Unfortunately, the vessels being used during the SEACAT 2018 exercise weren’t 
contracted quickly enough for the execution of our research.  
The change in focus to UN-sanction vessels would be much more time-
consuming for locating images, as the VOI increased from three to the 97 vessels 
mentioned on the UN-sanction list. While searching for images of the 97 vessels, we 
discovered that many of the vessels changed names over the years. The different names 
used for each vessel made the search a little more difficult, but even though the names 
might change, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) number never changed. 
Our searches started focusing on the IMO number instead of searching for the name of a 
particular vessel. The list of UN-sanctioned vessels, and the images gathered, would be 
used in our research in place of contracted vessels in order to test the ability to use CV to 
detect, classify, and identify VOI.  
2. Competing Priorities  
Priorities vary greatly, not only between nations, but in organizations also. With 
nine countries participating in the SEACAT exercise, the priorities among them never 
aligned. Each nation had its own agenda and goals to accomplish, so differences in 
priorities were to be expected. Some nations were more troubled with piracy, while 
others were more concerned with smuggling, trafficking, or illegal fishing. Differences in 
agendas and priorities among partner nations reduce collaboration and overall MDA in 
the SCS region.  
The three-dimensional model being built by employees from Progeny Systems 
assisting in our research would be used as part of the CV process. Unfortunately, our 
research project wasn’t the only thing Progeny had going on, and it was a project that the 
employees working with us would be doing on the side. Other projects the company had 
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undertaken took precedence over what we were asking them to do for us. Communication 
between both ends, us and Progeny employees, got delayed on several occasions. It took 
time for Progeny to figure out what exactly it was that we were looking for and how it 
was going to get accomplished. The two gentleman we worked with from Progeny, Tim 
and Karsten, would travel a lot (and overseas) for their company, which made for 
difficulties in catching them, and it would take time to respond to e-mail correspondence. 
We sent Progeny more than 475 photos of UN-sanctioned vessels we downloaded from 
different sources. The first set of photos, of just the UN-sanctioned vessels, were 
delivered to Progeny. Once received, we were asked to find the dates and locations where 
the photos were taken. Having to find the dates and locations of the photos delayed our 
research. This included returning to the photos’ website sources to search for additional 
dates and port location data. Eventually, we completed the new list of photos with the 
associated dates and locations. While incomplete, it provided a new list for Progeny to 
work with in looking at historical data through SPOTR. The historical data could be used 
to find the areas the VOI normally operate and where they have been detected.  
Several of the photos collected were taken many years ago, which didn’t provide 
much help to Progeny. We were asked to find dates and locations of sanctioned vessels 
that were more recent. Another search was conducted, using unclassified AIS databases, 
to find VOI broadcasting AIS in a more recent timeframe. We were able to find only five 
of the UN-sanctioned vessels that broadcasted their AIS data and get the dates and 
locations of when and where they broadcasted. This data was then sent to Progeny to be 
used to search DigitalGlobe to find an overhead image of the vessels to complete the 
three-dimensional models. The back-and-forth communication and discovery of 
requirements took several months and went beyond the timeframe of the SEACAT 
exercise. Once we delivered the images, along with dates and locations, we needed to 
wait for Progeny to have time between other projects to develop a three-dimensional 
model from the images received. Due to higher priorities at Progeny, the three-
dimensional model was never created or tested.  
Two tools that would be used in this research project are SPOTR, a product of 
Progeny Systems, and SeaVision, a product of the United States Department of 
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Transportation (DOT). These two projects would collaborate to ensure tracks would be 
ingested from SPOTR, when images matched the three-dimensional model being built, 
into SeaVision. The tracks being ingested into SeaVision would provide the COP for 
users, and the tracks would be created once VOI have been detected, classified, or 
identified by the use of UNCLAS imagery. Members from SPOTR and SeaVision 
assured us that the ability to ingest tracks from SPOTR to SeaVision was feasible, 
however, it would take time and collaboration between the two entities to make it work. 
Misunderstandings occurred; while SeaVision waited for SPOTR to ingest the tracks into 
their system, SPOTR needed tracks from SeaVision to validate their approach and ensure 
the tracks being ingested into SeaVision were in the proper format (Boger & Miller, 
2018). Both Progeny and the members from SeaVision, needed to compete with other 
priorities of their respective organizations and the integration between the two products 
remains incomplete.  
3. Participating Nations Unable to Meet Requirements  
Sharing information is critical in order to use CV to detect, classify, or identify 
VOI and enhance MDA in the SCS. The continuous sharing of information among 
nations in the Asia-Pacific region can be a tough task. Many nations appear hesitant to 
want to share information with others and typically require consistent pressure to 
continue sharing information to achieve the goal of improving MDA in the region (Boger 
& Miller, 2018). Continuous sharing of information among ASEAN partners requires a 
culture shift because of historical relations and tensions to create cooperation among 
them. This will help them to achieve their common objective of increased MDA.  
A lack of available resources among the ASEAN partners became a challenge for 
implementing our research into a real-world scenario. The U.S. DoD has an abundance of 
resources available to execute many military missions or exercises. Resources readily 
available to the DoD include personnel, ships, equipment, finances, and technology. 
Working with other nations can become complicated when there is a lack of resources in 
any of the areas mentioned. Compared to the United States, the ASEAN countries do not 
have as many naval assets or personnel available to them for exercises. The amount of 
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money spent on defense of the ASEAN nations pales in comparison to the amount spent 
on defense by the United States. The approximate amount spent on defense, in United 
States Dollars (USD), by the United States is $716 billion, while the amount spent by the 
nations participating in the SEACAT exercise comes to a total of approximately $35 
billion (Global Firepower, 2019). The $35 billion spent on defense by participating 
nations in SEACAT comes from eight nations combined. Singapore is the largest 
contributor, spending approximately $9.7 billion on defense (Global Firepower, 2019). 
While money being spent on defense may not determine one’s military strength, it most 
certainly provides the personnel and resources being used to carry out a country’s 
priorities. Resources available differ, not just with United States, but among ASEAN 
partners also, creating challenges with how much information and resources are being 
provided by participating nations. 
An easy way to share information among partners working together is to establish 
a web-centric enterprise, where all participants can collaborate. Our research planned to 
use CV and inject tracks into the SeaVision COP for all users to be able to provide and 
receive information needed to conduct operations and make operational decisions. A 
major challenge we faced with attempting to use this technology with our research is that 
most of the countries participating in the SEACAT exercise did not have Internet access 
onboard their ships. Not having Internet connectivity aboard the naval vessels became a 
major issue, as the participating ships could not access the information available to them. 
Some of the countries participating in the exercise had heard of SeaVision, and used the 
resource in some capacity, but there was also a lack of active accounts to access the 
information. Prior to the start of the SEACAT exercise, SeaVision accounts would need 
to be created, but with the lack of Internet connectivity on the ships, the need for account 
creation became moot.  
Another requirement unable to be met by the participants of SEACAT was 
implementing the idea of Pattern of Life (POL). POL is a term used in the military to 
determine behaviors and habits of people through surveillance over time and can be used 
to predict future movements and actions (Craddock, Watson, & Saunders, 2016). The use 
of CV, combined with SeaVision, could produce a POL of particular VOI. A historical 
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search of vessels could show where ships have been, ports frequently visited, how long 
typical port visits last, and typical routes the vessels take between ports. SeaVision 
account users only have access to the past 90 days of historical logs, making POL 
assumptions more difficult. Unfortunately, the concept of POL seemed too difficult for 
the ASEAN nations, as they each have very little experience in this area or have little 
desire to attempt pattern of life analysis.  
4. Limited to UNCLAS Images  
To ease the ability to share information among partners, we limited our research 
to only UNCLAS information. The photos we collected, along with the information on 
location and dates, all were taken from UNCLAS sources readily available to anyone 
with Internet access. SeaVision is a tool, available to all registered users, on UNCLAS 
networks; it allows users to enter and share information and detection of vessels among 
each other. Using only UNCLAS sources limited the number of photos and information 
on VOI for our research. Having access to, and using, classified sources would increase 
the number of photos collected, along with additional satellite images, dates, and 
locations. Classified sources would allow us to expand our search and increase the 
probability of finding information to aid in building the three-dimensional models of the 
VOI. Not every country participating in the SEACAT exercise has access to the same 
classified information, nor does every nation want to share what classified information 
they each have with one another.  
5. Large Amounts of Data  
According to Bernard Marr (2018), 2.5 quintillion bytes of data is created each 
day and 90 percent of the data generated in the world has been done so in the past two 
years. These statistics are taken from 2018 and, at the rate data is generated, the number 
of bytes of data created each day is probably even higher than 2.5 quintillion. This is a 
large amount of data being produced each day. While having lots of data may be a good 
thing, it is only useful if one knows how to make sense of the data and gather what might 
be beneficial to them. As multiple countries input data into SeaVision for all users to see, 
it could possibly flood the COP with too much information to be useful. Each nation 
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would need to sort through the data that is helpful to them to clear up their individual 
COP. Sorting through massive amounts of data being inserted by partners can become 
time-consuming and the information can quickly become irrelevant. The main challenge 
being faced here is how to find relevant data and make use of what is being shared by 
partner nations.  
B. ACTUAL RESULTS  
The goal of using SPOTR to create tracks for SeaVision did not come to full 
fruition during this period. However, valuable lessons were learned that can be 
implemented going forward. Keeping these things in mind can improve the process and 
yield actionable results. The following are factors that affect the results of the project 
moving forward.  
Completion of this project requires a concerted level of prioritization and 
coordination among the entities involved. The current priority for the SeaVision and 
SPOTR teams seems more of a side project. As of this writing there was no confirmation 
that SPOTR had fully fused with SeaVision to provide track data in a readable format. 
Progeny, the Department of Transportation Volpe Center, and DigitalGlobe continue to 
iron out the details to establish a system for feeding satellite imagery into SPOTR and 
converting the images into track data that can be piped into SeaVision. The process 
should include an automated method to feed imagery from the source into SPOTR for 
maximum efficiency. Manually locating and feeding images into SPOTR is time 
consuming and resource intensive. With increased focus on interoperation and 
implementation of all the system components, potential exists for a useful and valuable 
product.  
The DigitalGlobe image repository has inherent limitations with satellite imagery 
as its source. Satellite revisit times provide a ceiling on how many photos can be captured 
of an area of interest within a specific timeline. The swath area of the specific satellite 
limits the geographic area captured on each revisit. Cloud cover and weather interference 
further reduce the number of satellite images available. This is an inherent limitation on 
satellite imaging and, based on cursory investigation of the DigitalGlobe database, this 
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will affect the ability to gather source images for vessel detection and identification. 
Satellite imagery should be supplemented by other image sources, such as aerial or 
maritime imagery with accurate date and location metadata. Satellite imagery provides a 
good starting point for demonstrating a proof of concept with SPOTR. Evolution of the 
system should allow for using other image sources to increase the chances of detecting 
and identifying VOIs.  
Building an image library from unclassified sources poses a unique challenge. 
Only five of the 97 original VOIs had recent location data while in port from unclassified 
sources. Gathering photos of these vessels from the indicated location assists in obtaining 
an overhead vantage for creating the three-dimensional model and developing pattern of 
movement for the VOI. Finding identifying photos and building subsequent three-
dimensional models from unclassified sources can be challenging for uncooperative 
VOIs. VOIs, such as those on the sanctions list, are attempting to evade detection. This 
increases the likelihood they will not participate in such transportation reporting projects 
such as, MSSIS or VTS, since they want to shield their behavior and location. The greater 
the level of effort in ensuring that SPOTR would detect the vessel, the greater the 
occurrence of diminishing returns. The next step is determining whether the level of 
effort required to collect and develop the inputs matches the output received. This will 
depend on how many hits SPOTR generates on the given VOIs. The number and 
frequency of hits must be enough to generate historical tracking or pattern of life.  
Four of the five vessels were in China or Korea. Little imagery on the unclassified 
realm is available for these regions. The ports reported for these vessels could not be 
located on the DigitalGlobe unclassified image database. Using classified imagery may 
solve the problem, but defeats the purpose of creating an unclassified COP. Other 
unclassified satellite image sources besides DigitalGlobe may possess images of this 
region. Image sources other than satellite imagery are possibilities, however, it is likely 
that the sources providing these images would have to declassify them before use. VOI 
will operate and reside in sensitive areas where it may be difficult to obtain unclassified 
imagery of that region.  
41 
Starting from the original list of 97 vessels, we set out to develop an image library 
with photos of each of the vessels. Searching the unclassified image sources yielded 
photos for 62 of the 97 ships. Progeny requested location information for each of the 
photos discovered. This requirement reduced the number of ships to 51 that had location 
and date information for their photos. Of those 51, 41 of the ship’s photos were dated 
inside the DigitalGlobe database date range of 2014-present. Seeking to restrict the 
search to the most recent photos, we sorted the results to show only those photos from 
2018. Of the 41 ships, only nine had photos from 2018. We searched the entire list of 62 
ships that had images to see if any of them had broadcast AIS data in port in 2018. We 
found five ships from that list that had broadcasted. We cross-referenced these five 
against the ships that had images in the image library from 2018. Only one ship had both 
images from 2018 as well as broadcast AIS data in port during that same time span. 
These numbers are shown in Figure 8, where each requirement yields decreasing 
numbers of eligible vessels. 
 
Figure 8. Number of Eligible Ships at Each Requirement Level.  
The fact is unsurprising that as requirements become more stringent, fewer 
entities exist to meet those requirements. What was surprising was how restricted the 
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results were after meeting all requirements. Table 1 demonstrates the breakdown of 
percentiles with each successive requirement. The list dwindled from 97 to 62 with the 
requirement of finding photos, less than two thirds of the original number. The restriction 
of appending location and date information to photos further reduced the number of 
eligible ships to 51, almost half the original number. Restricting the ships to those that 
had photos within the date range for DigitalGlobe’s database reduced the number to 41, 
less than half of the starting amount. Focusing on ships with photos from the past year 
left less than ten percent of the original list. AIS data was only available for five of the 62 
ships with photos in the image library. Cross-referencing those five leaves us with one 
percent of the original list meeting all requirements, as shown in Figure 8. Failure to find 
an overhead image for developing the three-dimensional model for that single ship 
negates all the effort required to get to that point. The requirements need to expand to 
cover the entire time span, starting from 2014, instead of restricting to only 2018. Data of 
uncooperative vessels isn’t readily available from unclassified sources. Increasing the 
time window for gathering historical data, within the tolerances provided, increases the 
likelihood of finding useable and actionable information. Expanding the requirements 
increases the number of ships that will provide potential for developing a three-
dimensional model and decreases the likelihood that the search yields no results. 
Table 1. Percentage of Ships Meeting Specific Requirements.  
 Num  % Total  % Photos  % Location  
Total Ships  97  100%      
Ships w/ Photos  62  64%  100%    
Ships w/ Photos & Loc  51  53%  82%  100%  
Ships in 2018  9  9%  15%  18%  
Ships in 2017  9  9%  15%  18%  
Ships in 2016  25  26%  40%  49%  
Ships in 2015  16  16%  26%  31%  
Ships in 2014  8  8%  13%  16%  
Ships w/ Photos in DigitalGlobe Date Range  41  42%  66%  80%  
 
We were assigned to look for VOI that work hard to remain undetected. There are 
types of ships that ASEAN countries might also consider VOI, such as smuggler and 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The goal of our thesis project was to conduct an MDA experiment within the 
SEACAT 2018 exercise. The experiment was designed to test the ability to track VOI 
that are not broadcasting AIS data with the use of unclassified MDA tools, such as 
SeaVision and SPOTR. Unclassified photos of VOI were collected and used to create a 
three-dimensional model. Imagery, from unclassified sources ingested into SPOTR, was 
to be compared with the use of CV to the three-dimensional models to find a match. 
SeaVision would create tracks in its system, when there was a detection, classification, or 
identification of a VOI. These tracks would create a COP for all partner nations in SEA 
to use. This exercise would also test partner nations’ ability to share information, which is 
important for the successful enhancement of MDA. COPs are designed to assist the 
decision-maker in making intelligent operational decisions. As nations share information 
among one another, more tracks would be implemented into SeaVision creating a clearer 
picture for decision-makers. This experiment would also test the likeliness of detecting, 
classifying, and identifying VOI with the use of unclassified MDA tools. 
1. Results 
The operational scenario, designed by our predecessors, was not implemented 
during the SEACAT 2018 exercise. Although there is a high level of interest in MDA in 
the Asia-Pacific region, our focus of research never became a high enough priority in the 
area. The operational scenario would provide a platform to test the use of CV to detect 
VOI not broadcasting AIS data. This scenario would be conducted, using contracted 
vessels in a controlled environment, to test the ability and reliability of detecting, 
classifying, and identifying VOI. Once we concluded that the experiment would not be 
conducted during the SEACAT 2018 exercise, our focus shifted from using contracted 
vessels to using vessels from the UN-sanctioned list. By adding UN-sanction vessels to 
this research experiment, we increased the number of test subjects, from three to 97, and 
added a real-world element to the experiment. Unfortunately, the information required to 
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build the three-dimensional models (i.e., images from different angles, including 
overhead images) limited our searches from 97 ships to five. 
Employees from Progeny Systems would use the information and images 
gathered, through our research, to build the three-dimensional models. These three-
dimensional models, with the use of algorithms, would be compared with newly acquired 
images to detect a VOI. Once a detection, classification, or identification of a VOI 
occurred, information would get ingested into SeaVision, creating a track. This three-
dimensional model, to our knowledge, never got created. SPOTR, a tool from Progeny 
Systems, collects and processes data. This processed data gets compared with the three-
dimensional model and the information is sent to SeaVision for track creation. The 
process of sending information to SeaVision, and creating tracks for the COP, requires 
integration between the two systems and two organizations. The integration, between 
Progeny and SeaVision, never came to full fruition during our window of research, 
further limiting the ability to test the use of CV to detect VOI and enhance MDA. 
2. Challenges 
Throughout our research and implementation of the operational scenario, we 
faced many challenges, ultimately leading to a failure in conducting an operational test. 
Challenges faced with our research include the designed scenario being unattainable, 
competing priorities among entities, participating nations unable to meet the 
requirements, the image library being limited to only unclassified photos, and a large 
amount of data being produced and shared. Our objective was to implement a way of 
sharing information among partners to increase the MDA in the region. We attempted to 
do this by limiting our usage of photos to the unclassified level, which allows for ease 
and timely sharing of information.  With the change in focus to UN-sanction vessels, 
unclassified photos were tougher to find, along with information required to conduct 
testing, such as dates and locations of retrieved photos. 
The participating nations in the SEACAT 2018 exercise were mostly unable to 
meet the requirements to successfully test the use of CV with SeaVision, to detect VOI. 
In order to access SeaVision to view a COP with updated tracks, Internet connectivity, 
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along with account access, is required. A lack of resources, particularly the absence of 
Internet connectivity among ships, aided in the unsuccessful testing of the operational 
scenario. 
Priorities among the countries participating in SEACAT varied greatly. Some 
countries were more concerned with piracy, while others were more concerned with 
illegal fishing, smuggling, or trafficking. Competing agendas among nations made 
cooperation and sharing information more difficult. The Progeny Systems employees 
assisting us in our research had other projects they were working on. These projects took 
precedence over our area of research, and communication became delayed between the 
two sides with our competing schedules.  Ultimately, the differences in priorities among 
all participating organizations made the successful testing of CV to enhance MDA a 
difficult task. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Demonstrating the proof of concept for SPOTR and SeaVision would have a 
better chance of success with greater controls over the test environment. The test scenario 
should implement a constrained geographic area of travel for the test VOI. Limiting the 
geographic search area uses less time and resources during the testing scenario. In order 
to place this restriction on the VOI, the target should be a vessel under control of the 
researchers. This control enables researchers to gather images of the requisite angles 
required to create the three-dimensional image and build a historical timeline for the 
vessels’ location. The vessel movements can then be constrained or directed as needed, 
depending on where geographically the tests will be conducted. 
The requirements for creating three-dimensional models must be clearly defined 
in order to allow for the accurate and complete collection of the necessary data for model 
creation. The requirements should state the date, location details, and image angles that 
are needed to streamline the information process. The information needed should attempt 
to answer the questions of who, what, when and where for each VOI. 
More data sources must be identified for developing information on target vessels. 
Data sources during this research were limited to unclassified open-source data 
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repositories. While these sources provided valuable information, there is an inherent risk 
of error or misreporting that exists due to the open-source nature of the data. There is also 
the risk of information gaps. The information gaps can manifest themselves through 
limited images of a vessel, resulting in incomplete modeling through CV, spans of time 
where no images or vessel movement information is recorded, and incomplete or missing 
biographical data on vessels such country of origin or ownership. Expanding the data 
sources will likely decrease the number of data gaps for VOIs. 
More data sources are required for creating source imagery. Data sources can 
include other satellite imagery providers besides DigitalGlobe, aerial imagery from MPA, 
ISR and maritime reconnaissance and surveillance footage from ports and docks. 
DigitalGlobe is limited by the coverage of their constellation and the corresponding 
revisit times. Additionally, weather and atmospheric interference limit the number of 
usable images captured during those revisit times. A single source of data increases the 
chance that images of specific place at a specific time will not be available.  
C. FUTURE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
The use of unclassified applications with CV can be implemented into other areas 
in the future upon successful testing in a controlled environment. This process can be 
integrated onto naval warships, Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), UAVs, and even sail 
drones (a type of USV). Our CONOPS focused on the maritime domain, detecting VOI 
not broadcasting AIS information. Naval warships, along with MPAs and UAVs, could 
implement the use of commercial imagery to locate vessels to meet mission requirements. 
Detecting vessels that are not broadcasting AIS data isn’t limited to just vessels 
conducting piracy, illegal fishing, or smuggling. Commercial imagery with CV can locate 
and detect ships operating in territorial waters that are not their own, or locate other 
military vessels, whether in port or out to sea. 
UAVs and other drones are already being utilized by the U.S. Navy to support its 
missions. These UAVs can be used to provide imagery to feed the proper applications 
that are being used with CV to detect vessels. With equipment installed onboard naval 
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vessels, the imagery feeds can provide real-time or near real-time locations of VOI and 
provide clearer information for decision makers. 
While our thesis focused on unclassified imagery with commercial applications, 
this process can be further developed to include classified imagery. The use of classified 
imagery will limit the number of countries with access to them. Although the limited 
access to classified images may hinder some countries’ ability to use the information, it 
will provide a greater number of images to those countries with access. The greater 
number of images available from classified sources can create a better product by 
producing more options of pictures to create three-dimensional models. Creating more 
three-dimensional models and having more available sources of receiving images can 
enhance the ability to detect VOI 
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